We 
Introduction
Argumentation is a general approach to model defeasible reasoning, in which the two main issues are the generation of arguments and their exploitation so as to draw some conclusions based on the way arguments interact (see e.g., [17, 15] ).
Several theories of argumentation have been proposed so far (see among others [10, 14, 16, 12, 4, 1, 7] ). Among them is Dung's theory 1 [10] , which is quite influential since it encompasses many approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning and logic programming as special cases. In Dung's approach, no assumption is made about the nature of an argument (it can be a statement supported by some assumptions like in the theory introduced by Elvang-Gøransson et al. [13] but this is not mandatory). What really means is the way arguments interact w.r.t. the attack relation. Arguments and the way they interact w.r.t. the attack relation are considered as initial data of any argumentation framework, which can thus be viewed as a labeled digraph.
Several inference relations can be defined within Dung's theory. Usually, inference is defined at the argument level: an argument is considered derivable from an argumentation framework when it belongs to one (credulous accept-
The authors have been partly supported by the IUT de Lens, the Région Nord/Pas-de-Calais through the IRCICA Consortium and by the European Community FEDER Program. 1 Refined and extended by several authors, including [3, 2] . ability) (resp. all (skeptical acceptability)) extension(s) of under some semantics, where an extension of is a conflict-free and self-defending set of arguments, maximal for a given criterion (made precise by the semantics under consideration). While skeptical acceptability can be safely extended to the level of sets of arguments, this is not the case for credulous acceptability. Indeed, it can be the case that both arguments and are (individually) derivable from while the set is not included into any extension of . Now, defining acceptability for sets of arguments as inclusion into some (resp. all) extensions under Dung's semantics does not always lead to expected conclusions. Consider Example 1:
Example 1 Let with and
. The digraph for is depicted on the following figure.
On this example, whatever the semantics and the inference relation (skeptical or credulous) among Dung's ones, is derivable from . However, is attacked by and the unique defeater of is controversial w.r.t. (an argument is said to be controversial w.r.t. an argument if indirectly attacks and indirectly defends ). So it is not cautious to infer .
One way to cope with this problem is to suppress indirect conflicts 2 from the different extensions (under all semantics). Forbidding indirect conflicts in extensions does not prevent all arguments which are indirectly attacked from belonging to some extensions. This only prevents pairs of arguments which conflict indirectly from belonging to the same extension. In our opinion, such a cautious approach is sensible whenever we want to infer sets of arguments: infering together two arguments which conflict indirectly is not prudent.
This problem is not avoided by Dung's semantics. Thus, has a single extension whatever the semantics among Dung's ones. Consequently, and are always jointly derivable from while is controversial w.r.t. . In this paper, we define and study new semantics for Dung's framework, based on a more demanding notion of absence of conflict, since indirect attacks are not allowed within a prudent, admissible set. Especially, a prudent, admissible set never includes pairs of controversial arguments. We compare the inference relations induced by such new semantics with Dung's ones and show that in many cases one obtains more cautious notions of derivability.
Dung's Theory of Argumentation
Let us present some basic definitions at work in Dung's theory of argumentation [10] . We restrict them to finite argumentation frameworks.
Definition 1 (argumentation frameworks) A finite argumentation framework is a pair
where is a finite set of so-called arguments and is a binary relation over (a subset of ), the attacks relation.
A first important notion is the notion of acceptability: an argument is acceptable w.r.t. a set of arguments whenever it is defended by the set, i.e., every argument which attacks is attacked by an element of the set.
Definition 2 (acceptable sets) Let be a finite argumentation framework. An argument is acceptable w.r.t. a subset of if and only if for every s.t. , there exists s.t. . A set of arguments is acceptable w.r.t. when each of its elements is acceptable w.r.t. .
A second important notion is the notion of absence of conflicts. Intuitively, two arguments should not be considered together whenever one of them attacks the other one.
Definition 3 (conflict-free sets) Let be a finite argumentation framework. A subset of is conflictfree if and only if for every , we have .
Requiring the absence of conflicts and the form of autonomy captured by self-acceptability leads to the notion of admissible set.
Definition 4 (admissible sets) Let be a finite argumentation framework. A subset of is admissible for if and only if is conflict-free and acceptable w.r.t. .
The significance of the concept of admissible sets is reflected by the fact that every extension of an argumentation framework under the standard semantics introduced by Dung (preferred, stable, complete and grounded extensions) is an admissible set, satisfying some form of optimality: 
Among the fixed points of
, the grounded extension of is the least element w.r.t. [10] . Finally, several notions of derivability of an argument (or more generally a set of arguments) from an argumentation framework can be defined by requiring that the (set of) argument(s) is included into an extension (credulous acceptability) or every extension (skeptical acceptability) of of a specific kind. Obviously enough, credulous derivability and skeptical derivability w.r.t. the grounded extension coincide, since there cannot be more than one grounded extension for any argumentation framework.
Prudent Extensions
In order to address scenarios like in Example 1 in a more satisfying way, we need to refine Dung's notion of admissibility, by requiring that no indirect conflict occurs within an admissible set of arguments; this leads to the notion of p-admissible set: Note that this lemma does not prevent or from belonging to a p-admissible set for , but not to the same one.
Actually, the absence of controversial arguments is only necessary. In particular, no arguments belonging to an oddlength cycle of can also belong to a p-admissible set. Thus, our approach departs from [2] who consider that oddlength and even-length cycles in an argumentation framework should be considered in the same way. Especially, it is not cautious to consider within a single extension the arguments of an odd-length cycle since they attack themselves indirectly. Furthermore, any argument from an odd-length cycle is controversial w.r.t. an argument of the cycle.
On this ground, one can define several notions of prudent extensions, echoing Dung's ones. Let start with preferred pextensions:
Definition 8 (preferred p-extensions) Let be a finite argumentation framework. A p-admissible set for is a preferred p-extension of if and only if s.t. and is p-admissible for .

Example 1 (cont'ed)
is the unique preferred pextension of . We have the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Let be a finite argumentation framework.
The set of all p-admissible subsets of for
is a complete set of .
For every p-admissble set for , there exists at least one preferred p-extension of s.t. .
Since is p-admissible for any
, we obtain:
Corollary 1 Every finite argumentation framework has a preferred p-extension.
What can be found in preferred p-extensions? Though every argument which is not attacked belongs at least to one preferred p-extension of , it is not the case in general that it belongs to every preferred p-extension of . On the other hand, whenever an argument belongs to a preferred pextension of , all its mandatory defenders also belong to it (but the condition is not sufficient): Since is finite, the sequence is stationary from some rank , so the following definition of the grounded p-extension of is well-founded:
Definition 11 (grounded p-extensions) Let be a finite argumentation framework. Let be the lowest integer such that the sequence is stationary from rank .
is the grounded p-extension of .
Example 1 (cont'ed)
is the grounded p-extension of . Like the grounded extension, the grounded p-extension of an argumentation framework includes the set of the elements of which are not attacked. Hence:
Lemma 4 Let be a finite argumentation framework. If is acyclic, then the grounded p-extension of is nonempty.
Thus, every finite argumentation framework has at least one preferred p-extension, a unique grounded p-extension and zero, one or many stable p-extensions.
Let us now introduce a notion of complete p-extension.
Definition 12 (complete p-extensions) Let be a finite argumentation framework and let be a padmissible set for . is a complete p-extension of if and ony if every argument which is acceptable w.r.t. and without indirect conflicts with belongs to .
From the definition, it comes immediately that:
Lemma 5 A set of arguments without indirect conflicts is a complete p-extension of if and only if .
We also have:
Lemma 6 The grounded p-extension of a finite argumentation framework is a complete p-extension of .
While the grounded extension of an argumentation framework is included into the intersection of all the complete extensions of , it is not the case in general that the grounded p-extension of is included into every preferred p-extension of . Let us now define several inference relations based on our prudent semantics for argumentation frameworks: 
In the light of the two tables, one can observe that the most cautious inference relations among those considered here is . As expected, credulous prudent inference relations are strictly more cautious than credulous nonprudent ones. More surprisingly, is strictly more cautious than . Before concluding the paper, let us briefly consider some complexity issues related to our prudent inference relations. First of all, it is easy to show that, given a finite argumentation framework , deciding whether an argument indirectly attacks another argument and deciding whether a set of arguments is free of indirect conflict (resp. is padmissible for , is a stable p-extension of , is the grounded p-extension of ) are in P. We showed in a previous paper [6] that considering sets of arguments (instead of single arguments) as input queries for the inference problem does not lead to a complexity shift (the purpose is to determine whether such sets are derivable from a given finite argumentation framework ). As to the prudent inference relations, it comes that deciding whether a set of arguments is a preferred p-extension of or whether it is included into all stable p-extensions of are in coNP, and that deciding whether a set of arguments is included into a preferred p-extension (resp. a stable pextension) of is in NP. Finally, deciding whether a set of arguments is included into all preferred p-extensions of is in . Accordingly, our prudent inference relations are not computationally more complex that the corresponding ones based on Dung's semantics (see [8, 11] ).
Conclusion and Perspectives
We have presented new prudent semantics within Dung's theory of argumentation. Under such prudent semantics, two arguments cannot belong to the same extension whenever one of them attacks indirectly the other one. This leads to a better handling of controversial arguments than in Dung's approach.
Our work calls for some perspectives. One of them consists in developing specific algorithms for computing prudent extensions, based on algorithms for computing extensions like those described in [5, 9] .
